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STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings by altering the findings of
fact of the Trial court and justifying a remedy of reformation,
when clearly the Trial Court determined facts which warrant a
remedy of rescission.
2.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred by substantially
departing from ordinary judicial proceedings when the Court relied
on facts that were contrary to the record and Findings of Fact as
follows:
A. that the legal description of the property in the
deed did not include the 1.11 acre figure when the legal
description did; and
B. the legal description in the deed was not the same as
the legal description in the Earnest Money Agreement when in
all material respects the deed was; and
C. that acreage was not important to the parties when it
was the very assumption upon which the parties based their
agreement; and
D.
that the Court found there was a mistaken legal
description made in the process of reducing the agreement to
writing when it was not a mistaken legal description but
rather a mistaken survey upon which the parties relied to sell
the property at all.
E.
That the Trust did not convey property described in
the deed where the description the Trust conveyed was the one
intended.
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this matter was filed
October 24, 1990, and is published as Grahn v. Gregory at 146 Utah
Adv. Rep. 47.

(A copy is attached hereto as Appendix "C".)
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the decision
of the Court of Appeals in this action by a writ of certiorari
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (a.) and § 78-2-2(5) (1990).
1

The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered on October 24,
1990.

Appellants

filed a Petition for Rehearing and an Order

denying the Petition was entered on November 14, 1990.
filed a Motion

Appellants

for Extension of Time for filing Petition

for

Certiorari on December 11, 19 90 on the grounds that counsel for
Appellants would have insufficient time to prepare the Petition by
deadline since they had another appellate brief due in another
case.

The Order granting the extension for thirty (30) days was

entered on December 12, 1990.

Pursuant to the Order, the deadline

for filing the Petition for Certiorari is January, 14, 1991.
Petition

is being

filed

timely, therefore

is

subject

The

to this

Court's review.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a civil matter which was originally decided in the
Third

District

Court

for the State

of

Utah.

The

appellants

appealed the matter to the Utah Supreme Court, and the Utah Supreme
Court transferred the case to the Utah Court of Appeals.

As

described above, the Utah Court of Appeals rendered its decision
and the opinion has since been published in the Utah Advanced
Reports, cited as Grahn v. Gregory, 146 Utah Adv. Rep. 47.

The

Appellants filed a Petition for Rehearing, which was denied.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts of this case are more fully set forth with detailed
citation to the record in Appellants' briefs filed with the Utah
Court of Appeals.
limitation

set

In order to conform this Petition to the page

forth

in the Rules
2

of Appellate

Procedure

for

Petitions for Certiorari, it would be impossible to include all the
relevant facts of the case in detail here.

For the Court's

convenience, the Appellants have attached hereto as Appendix "A" a
photocopy of the Statement of Facts from its Reply Brief in the
Court of Appeals. The following is an abbreviated summary of those
facts:
1.

The Appellant Trust owned a parcel of real property in

Salt Lake County which included a house and driveway thereon. The
Trust sought to subdivide off a one-half acre parcel of the
property to convey to a beneficiary of the Trust, so that said
beneficiary could build a separate house thereon.

(Transcript

(hereinafter "TR") pp. 286-289; pp. 416-419)
2.

The Trust contracted with a surveyor, Scott McNeil, to

conduct a physical survey of the land and to prepare a written
(drawn)

survey

and

legal

description

of

the

parcel

being

subdivided. (TR pp. 222, 237, 238, 289, 418 and 419)
3.

Mr. McNeil was instructed to divide the half-acre parcel

off the southeast portion of the property, using the driveway as a
boundary, if possible.

He was also specifically instructed that

the parcel to be subdivided had to be at least one-half acre of
land in order to conform with the zoning requirements for building
on the property.

The trust gave McNeil the legal description for

the entire parcel which was an old

legal description which

purportedly contained 1.67 acres of land.

(TRpp. 237, 238, 300,

418, 419 and 422)
4. Mr. McNeil conducted his physical survey to subdivide the
3

property, during which he made an error in turning a curve.

Mr.

McNeil did not discover the error, and consequently incorporated it
into his survey drawing and into his placement of the survey
stakes.

He then prepared a legal description of the half-acre

parcel from his survey.

(TR pp. 227, 228, 419, 452, 453; Trial

Exh. 1-P)
5.

The survey drawing showed that: (a) the driveway was

located on the larger Estate parcel hereinafter referred to as
Parcel 1, containing 1.11 acres, and (b) Parcel 2 (the one-half
acre parcel) containing .56 acres.
6.

(Trial Exh. 1-P)

The survey drawing illustrated that both of the Trust's

conditions for subdividing the property could be met, i.e., that
the driveway could stay on Parcel 1, and Parcel 2 would be a
buildable parcel which contained at least one-half acre.

(Trial

Exh. 1-P)
7.

Parcel 2 was subsequently conveyed to the beneficiary of

the Trust using the surveyor's legal description of Parcel 2, but
she changed her mind about building because of the estimated cost,
and, without ever learning that the surveyor had made a mistake,
she reconveyed Parcel 2 back to the Trust.
8.

(TR pp. 157 and 420)

Later, the Trust decided to sell the 1.67 acre property,

and listed the property for sale. The listing agent represented to
Grahns that the property could be sold in one parcel or separated
into two parcels according to the survey and sold separately. The
Trust agreed to subdivide the parcel and sell Grahns part of the
property, since Grahns could not afford to purchase the entire lot,
4

but only Parcel 1.
9.

(TR pp. 7, 27, 28, 45, 57, 59, 99, 113 and 114)

The real estate agent who had listed the property walked

the property with the Grahns and indicated to them the old survey
stakes placed by Mr. McNeil which had not been removed, and which
showed that the driveway was included on the parcel with the
existing house (Parcel 1). (TR pp. 56, 57, 86 and 139)
10.
1

from

Josephine Grahn obtained the legal description for Parcel
the

description

Salt
the

Lake
County

County

Recorder's

presumably

Office

prepared

from

which

legal

the

legal

description McNeil prepared for Parcel 2. (TR, p. 84)
11.

The parties

entered

into the Earnest Money Sales

Agreement using a legal description that the Grahns had obtained
from the County which the County prepared by taking the old legal
description

of

the

entire

parcel

and

subtracting

from

that

description the property McNeil described as Parcel 2, according to
his survey.

On the legal description of Parcel 1, which the Trust

and Grahns included in the Earnest Money Agreement showed that it
contained 1.11 acres. The Earnest Money Agreement Grahns prepared
also stated it was an Agreement to buy and sell "The 1.11 acre
property according to the legal description on the exhibit attached
hereto."
12.

(TR p. 84; Trial Exh. 2-P)
Grahns knew when they purchased Parcel 1 that the Trust

needed at least one-half acre on the smaller parcel in order to
obtain a building permit for that parcel. In the Addendum attached
to the Earnest Money Agreement, the parties made reference to the
"half-acre parcel" at least five times. (TR p. 99; Trial Exh. 2-P)
5

13.

When the Trust and Grahns closed on the purchase of

Parcel 1, they used the legal description attached to the Earnest
Money Agreement.

The legal description attached to the Earnest

Money Agreement was in abbreviated terms so when the title company
presumably prepared the final deed they wrote out in long-hand the
abbreviated terms and omitted the reference to 1.11 acres.

They

also supplied clarifying language regarding radius and curvature.
The description used in the deed was identical in metes and bounds,
size and shape. However, Grahns demanded a warranty from the Trust
that Parcel 1 was legally subdivided.

Grahns also requested that

the Trust give them a 25 foot easement from the road.

The Trust

refused but finally agreed to give Grahns a 15 foot easement along
the road.

The Trial Court found the parties accepted that 1.11

acres was the size of Parcel 1.

(Trial Exh. 2-P; Trial Exh. 15-D;

TR pp. 182-184; Record pp. 530-538, Finding No. 13)
14.

Appellants Bradshaw subsequently contracted with the

Trust to purchase Parcel 2.

Mr. Bradshaw obtained a copy of the

erroneous survey drawing from Mrs. Gregory

(the parties had not

discovered the mistake at that time) and, using that survey,
designed a house to build on Parcel 2. When Mr. Bradshaw went onto
the property on Parcel 2 to begin measuring for his house, he
discovered that the house he had designed using the survey would
not fit on the parcel.

He then informed the Gregorys that

something was wrong and the Gregorys contacted Mr. McNeil.

Mr.

McNeil came to the property and conducted another physical survey
in which he discovered that he had originally made an error in
6

turning a curve.
road.

The legal description of Parcel 2 included the

(Record, pp. 46 and 47; TR pp. 169-171, 369, 372, 373, 381,

383, 397, 398; Trial Exh. 7-P)
15. All the parties to both purchases testified at trial that
they were relying on the erroneous survey when they made their
contracts.
16.

(TR pp. 81-83, 168, 369)
There was no overlap in the deeds for Parcels 1 and 2.

Grahns never had a recorded interest in Parcel 2.
17.

(TR pp. 63-64)

At the time the parties discovered the mistake, the

Bradshaws and Trust had not closed on the sale of Parcel 2, but
subsequently did close because they believed they had a binding
contract.
18.

(TR pp. 175-177)
The surveyor performed a revised survey using the road as

the boundary between the two parcels.
property line approximately 20 feet.

This survey moved the

This increases the size of

Parcel 1 by approximately .20 acres. Subtracting from Parcel 2 the
15 foot aesthetic easement which runs along the road, the useable
space of Parcel 2 is further reduced to approximately 1/3 of the
assumed .56 acres.
19.

(Trial Exh. 19-D)

As a result of the mistake, the Trust and Bradshaws were

left with a parcel of ground that is less than one-half acre,
substantially steeper than the originally surveyed parcel and only
large enough to build a much smaller home.

(Trial Exh. 19-D)

20. Had the mistake not occurred, the Trust would never have
subdivided the property into two parcels, nor would they have sold
the property as two parcels, but would have sold the property as
7

one parcel. They would not have sold Parcel 1 to Grahns.

(TR pp.

209, 301, 422, 316)
ARGUMENT
I•

THE COURT OF APPEALS' RULING OF REFORMATION CREATES A CONTRACT
FOR THE PARTIES WHICH THEY DID NOT INTEND TO MAKE.
When the Trust agreed to sell Parcel 1 to Grahns, the

parties

were

relying

upon

one

written

(drawn)

survey

and

corresponding survey stakes for their understanding of the sizes
and boundaries of the two parcels. The survey was performed years
earlier and not as part of the sale.

The Trust obtained the

erroneous survey for the purpose of subdividing off a portion of
land on the southeast corner of the property to convey separately
to someone who could build a house thereon. The Trust had made the
subdivision conditional upon being able to include the driveway on
the parcel containing the existing house (Parcel 1), but still
leaving at least one-half acre on the smaller southeast parcel
(Parcel 2) since the zoning regulations for that area required onehalf acre to build.

Unknown to anyone, the surveyor had made an

error in calculations while conducting his physical survey, and the
resulting written survey, upon which the Grahns and Gregorys later
relied when they contracted for the sale of Parcel 1, correctly
reflected the sizes of the parcels the parties intended to convey
but did not reflect the actual location of the driveway.

The

survey showed the existing house and driveway to be situated within
the confines of the parcel Grahns were purchasing, showed the
boundary between the two parcels to be the southeast side of the

8

driveway, and showed the southeast parcel (Parcel 2) to contain .56
acres.
1.

The survey was a condition precedent to the sale of Parcel

Therefore, the parties relied on the survey in order to

subdivide the property to accomplish both sales.
The Utah Court of Appeals in Mooney v. G.R* Associates, 746
P. 2d 1174 (Ut.App. 1987) stated "It is well settled that a contract
is voidable if there is a mutual mistake of material fact. J[ci. at
1178 (citing to Kiahtipes v. Mills, 649 P.2d 9, 13 (Utah 1982) and
Langston v. McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554, 557 (Utah Ct.App.1987) ) . See
also Tanner v. District Judges of Third Judicial District, 649 P.2d
5 (Utah 1982) .
The Grahns, the Trial Court and Court of Appeals argue that
the parties intended to include the land to the road in the sale of
Parcel 1.

They argue the buyers are entitled to a reformation of

their agreement to include additional land to include the road
because of an error of the draftsman of the legal description.
Here, however, the mistake in the case goes far deeper than
that.

It was not a mistake in reducing the agreement to writing,

but rather a mistake in the bargaining process.

A mistake that

changed not only the amount of acreage the parties intended to
convey, but changed the size, shape, boundary, marketability and,
therefore, the value and use of the remaining parcel. Now, instead
of conveying one parcel of 1.11 acres and a second of .56 acres,
the lower courts would force the seller to convey one parcel of
1.30 acres leaving a parcel of less than a half-acre with a 15 foot
easement that runs almost entirely along the northwest border,
9

further restricting the use of the property.

The Trust is left

with a parcel of property where they lose the flat portion of the
parcel.

They are left with the steepest part of the parcel as

being the buildable space. Whether the remaining lot is buildable
at all is problematic.

It will require a petition to the County

and approval by them in order to build.

Taking the easement from

the additional l/5th of the lot taken restricts the parcel in one
place to a narrow neck of property. The sellers never intended the
conveyance to create such a property.
When the seller sold the property, they conveyed exactly what
they intended to convey in the deed.

The mistake concerned the

location of the road, not the legal description of the property.
The Trust conveyed exactly the amount of acreage they intended to
convey - 1.11 acres, leaving .56 acres for Parcel 2.

This is far

different from a scriveners mistake, which the Court of Appeals and
Grahns contend.
In fact, the Trial Court found that acreage was important to
the parties.

In its finding of fact, the Trial Court found the

parties accepted

1.11 acres as the size of Parcel 1.

This

assumption was based on the need for a minimum of .5 acres for
Parcel 2.

The Court, in an effort to be fair, further found that

because the parties did not intend to convey more than 1.11 acres
and because Grahns were now receiving approximately 1.3 acres, the
Trial Court ordered that Grahns pay for the additional acreage,
which the parties did not intend to convey.
reversed this ruling.

The Court of Appeals

The Trial Court erred also in remaking the
10

contract.
In footnote

5 of the Court of Appeal's

decision, they

distinguish "on their facts" several cases the Trust cites in
support of their position.

In Eiland v. Powell, 136 W.Va. 25, 65

S.E.2d 737, 742 (1951) the legal description was identical to the
legal description in the contract, thus there was no mistake by a
drafter, just in the representations made by the seller. This case
is right on point with the subject case.

Although the Court of

Appeals necessarily needed to distinguish that case, the legal
description in the agreement and in the deed were exactly what the
parties intended and were in essential terms identical.

Thus,

there was no mistake made by a drafter of the deed.
The Court of Appeals also attempted to distinguish the case of
Chesapeake Homes, Inc. v. McGraff, 249 Md. 480, 240 A2d 245, 249
(Ct. App. 1968).
the

legal

In the Chesapeake case, there was no mistake in

description

of

misrepresented the boundary.

the

property;

the

seller

had

The Court correctly concluded the

parties did not come to an agreement in the first instance.

The

Chesapeake case is also directly on point with the case before this
Court.
Lastly, the Court of Appeals attempts to distinguish the case
of Bartlett v. Dept. of Transportation, 40 Md. App. 47, 388 A.2d
930 (1978) in which the Court dealt with the issue of reformation
of a deed when the parties believed the parcel to be 2-1/2 acres
smaller than it actually was. The Bartlett Court reasoned that if
a discrepancy in the size of the parcel would not have prevented
11

the party from entering the contract, the mistake is immaterial and
reformation

is appropriate.

JTd. at 933.

identical to the case before this Court.

Bartlett is also

The sellers would not

have entered into the agreement had they known the effect the
mistaken survey and location of the road would have on the agreed
exchange of performances.

The mistake seriously affects the use

and value of Parcel 2.

This certainly was not the Trust's

intention when they sold the property.

The extent of the Trust's

injury will not be known until such time as the County considers a
request for a variance and a building permit.
The Court of Appeals was also mislead by finding that only
Gregory's self-serving statements support his argument that the
acreage was essential to the parties' agreement. The Earnest Money
Agreement specifically references the amount of acreage of Parcel
1

and

Parcel

2.

The Gregorys' intentions with

respect to

subdivision of the property were made known at the outset.
In fact, the survey was a condition precedent to the Trust's
ability to even sell the parcel to Grahns. But for the survey, the
Grahns never could have purchased Parcel 1.

Therefore, the sale

itself assumed the survey was valid. Without the survey, the Trust
would have sold the entire 1.67 acre parcel as one piece. But for
the Trust's beneficence in trying to work with the Grahns and in
reliance on the survey, could the Grahns have purchased the
property.

In other words, the entire sale was based upon the

erroneous survey.

12

NO MEETING OF THE MINDS
The property the parties intended to buy and sell never
existed.

That is to say, a parcel consisting of 1.11 acres

including the road.

Therefore, the parties could not have had a

meeting of the minds for the purchase and sale of the property
because it did not exist.

This was not merely a mistake in

reducing the parties intentions to a written document.

This was

not merely a scriveners mistake.
In this case, the surveyor had prepared the legal description
for Parcel 2 from his survey; therefore, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals embraced Grahns' position that, since the Grahns
and Gregorys intended for Parcel 1 to include the driveway and
Grahns' legal description on their deed does not contain the land
under the driveway, then this was a case of a mistake in the legal
description which warranted rescission.

The parties in this case

based their agreement on erroneous assumptions.
The trial court ruled that the Grahn Deed be reformed to
include acreage from the other parcel which actually contained the
driveway, but the trial court, in an effort to be fair, and
realizing that his ruling of reformation would give the Grahns more
acreage than the parties had intended ruled that the Grahns must
pay for the additional acreage received through reformation of
their deed.
The remedy of reformation is proper when there is a meeting of
the minds in an antecedent agreement but, in the process of
reducing an agreement to writing, the draftsman makes an error and
13

the resulting written instrument does not reflect the actual
agreement which the parties made.

66 AM. JUR. 2d Reformation of

Instruments, s 13 (1973); Harley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., et al,
37 N.E.2d 760 (111. 1941); Chesapeake Homes, Inc. v. McGraff, 240
A.2d 245 (Md.App. 1968)
Logically, in a case where reformation is proper, the reformed
instrument must reflect what the parties actually agreed upon. The
lower Court attempted to make an agreement for the parties which
they did not themselves make.

Mrs. Grahn testified that the

Gregorys agreed to subdivide the property according to the survey
and sell Parcel 1 separately to the Grahns because Grahns could not
afford the entire piece of property.

But Gregorys testified that

they would not have agreed to do so had they known of the mistake
in the survey.

Therefore, knowledge of the true nature of the

property would have resulted in the Gregorys' deciding not to
subdivide the property but to sell it in one piece.

Since Grahns

could not afford the entire piece, Gregorys would have never made
any contract with Grahns. Moreover, even though Grahns argue that
they were not concerned with Parcel 2 or the Gregorys' intentions
regarding that parcel, it is not necessary to establish that the
mistake affected Grahns' intentions, because "[a] mistake which
leads one or both parties to enter into a contract which they would
not have entered into had they known the facts will not justify
reformation." 66 AM. JUR. 2D Reformation of Instruments s 13
(1973); Metzler v. Bolen, 137 F. Supp. 457, (DC ND 1956) (emphasis
supplied).
14

Neither lower court specifically ruled by clear and convincing
evidence that the Trust did not convey what it intended.

In fact,

the Trust conveyed in the deed the property they intended to
convey, based on the survey.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINDING REGARDING ACREAGE WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, AND,
IMPROPERLY MADE ITS OWN FINDINGS THAT ACREAGE WAS NOT
IMPORTANT TO THE TRANSACTION, AND THAT REFORMATION OF THE
GRAHN DEED WILL NOT AFFECT THE BUILDABILITY OF PARCEL TWO,
NEITHER OF WHICH ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE RECORD.
Grahns argue that they were not concerned with the amount of

acreage they were purchasing, but just wanted the driveway, and
therefore the mistake was not mutual. Whether they were concerned
about acreage or not is irrelevant.

Grahns believed they were

purchasing the driveway in reliance on the survey stakes, on the
drawn survey which showed the driveway as the boundary, and on
Gregorys' representation that Grahns were purchasing the driveway,
all of which were innocently based upon the erroneous survey.

In

the case of Chesapeake Homes, Inc. v. McGraff, 240 A. 2d 245
(Md.App. 1968), a case close on point with this case, the Court of
Appeals in Maryland stated:
Where the facts show the mutual mistake to be
actually a product of false, although
innocent, representations as to the subject
matter of the contract, the result is that the
parties have not in fact come to any
agreement, and reformation will not correct
the effort. This is easily absorbed within
the facts of the present case. It is not the
description of the land in the contract which
is a mistake, but the identity of the lot
itself. Therefore, reformation was not the
proper remedy.
Id. at 249.
15

Even if Grahns were not concerned about acreage, it was all
important to the transaction since the contract would not have been
made at all had the Gregorys known that including the driveway with
Parcel 1 would rob Parcel 2 of essential acreage.
The Trial Court made a specific finding of fact that 1.11
acres was the amount of acreage accepted by Grahns and Gregorys as
the amount being purchased and sold for Parcel 1. The Court would
not

have made

important.

that

finding

if

it believed

acreage was not

The trial court understood that by reforming Grahns'

deed, he was giving them more land than they had actually purchased
or than Gregorys had intended to sell them.

In an effort to be

fair, he therefore ruled that Grahns pay for that extra land.
Thus, he recognized that acreage was important, but failed to
recognize that rescission, not reformation, would be the proper
remedy hers*.
The Court of Appeals agreed with Grahns' argument that acreage
was not important to their transaction and that therefore the
mistake was not mutual. The Court of Appeals' conclusion that the
Trial Court's finding regarding acreage was "clearly erroneous" is
inconsistent with the record.

The findings of fact that the

parties understood the private drive was the boundary and included
within the legal description of Parcel 1, and that they understood
Parcel 1 to contain 1.11 acres do not conflict because the parties
were under mistaken assumptions because of the survey.

It is

undoubtedly true that Grahns are happy with the results in the
courts below since, not only do they receive additional acreage
16

free, but the adjacent lot will likely be rendered unbuildable.
Grahns will effectively have the use of the entire piece of
property even though they paid only for 1.11 acres.
The Trial Court also made its own finding that Parcel 2 is
still buildable. Apparently, the Court partially based that on the
comments of Grahns' counsel in their brief and at the oral argument
before the Court of Appeals.

Counsel stated:

"Well, your honor,

it is buildable, and in fact the only testimony in trial said that
it was buildable.

The Grahns brought in the County Planning and

Zoning Manager, Mr. Reynolds, who indicated there could be a
variance granted. . . he indicated that he felt in his testimony that
there could be variance granted if one were asked for ... so the
evidence in court . . . was that the lot is buildable and there is no
unconscionable

situation which would

contract as the parties agreed."

occur

by

enforcing

the

(Refer to the tape of the oral

argument before the Court of Appeals which is on record.)

Mr.

Reynolds actually testified:
(By Mr. Woodbury on cross examination of Mr. Reynolds:)
Q.

Now, is it my understanding that you said
a variance could be attained?

A.

I didn't say it could. They may apply and maybe it
will be approved; but that is a way of proceeding
with a reduction of area.

Q.

Okay. I stand corrected. But the buildability of
the lot would still be an issue that would have to
be approved; is that correct?

A.

That is correct.

(See excerpt from Transcript attached hereto as Appendix "B")
The property on Parcel 2 is very steep.
17

The portion of that

parcel which is the most level will be severely reduced by the
reformation of Grahnsr deed.

The steepness and terrain of the

property were the reasons why that parcel needed to contain at
least one-half acre exactly where the Trust wanted it before they
would subdivide the property.

If the deed on the other parcel is

reformed, the remaining property on parcel two will be so steep
that it could very well be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain
a variance to build.
III. BRADSHAWS ARE BONA FIDE PURCHASERS, WHICH CUTS OFF THE RIGHT
OF REFORMATION.
In the case of Hottinqer v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah,
1984), the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that "...the right of
reformation of a deed can be cut off by purchase of the property by
a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the mistake."
The Court of Appeals recognized that this Court defined "bona fide
purchaser" in Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P. 2d 298 (Utah 1978), as
"one who takes property without actual or constructive knowledge of
facts

which

are

sufficient

complainant's equity,"

to

put

him

on

notice

of

the

and also recognized that this Court, in

defining notice, has stated that
[ajctual or constructive notice defeats a
subsequent purchaser's interest. A subsequent
purchaser must therefore, show that he had no
actual notice, i.e., no personal knowledge, of
a prior conveyance or that the prior
conveyance did not impart constructive notice,
i.e., was not recorded before his conveyance
in the same land was recorded.
Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 904, 906 n.2
(Utah 1986) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have ignored
18

that the prior cases in Utah established that the "notice" which
defeats a subsequent purchasers interest is notice of a prior
conveyance of the same land he is purchasing, not merely notice
that his survey contains an error.
deeds.

There was no overlap in the

At the time the mistake was discovered, Bradshaw had

secured an equitable interest in the parcel he was buying through
a contract to purchase.

Grahns had not secured any ownership

interest, equitable or otherwise, in any portion of that parcel.
Even when Bradshaws closed and took title to Parcel 2 no prior
conveyance had been made of any portion of the property he was
purchasing. Therefore Bradshaws conform to this Court's definition
of a bona fide purchaser since they had no actual or constructive
notice, not even at the time they closed, of any prior conveyance
of the same land they were purchasing.
The Utah Supreme Court should grant certiorari to review this
issue because the previous law in Utah on this subject contradicts
the finding of the trial court and affirmation of the Court of
Appeals that Bradshaws were not bona fide purchasers which would
cut off the right to reform the Grahn deed.
The Utah Supreme Court confirms this point in Ingram v.
Forrer, 563 P. 2d 181 (Utah 1977).

The Court held "an honest

difference of understanding as to what the contract was is fatal to
reformation for in such case there is no such meeting of the minds
of the parties and no pre-existing agreement to which the written
instrument can be conformed." Id. at 182.
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CONCLUSION
The result of Mr. McNeil's mistake in conducting and preparing
his survey, was that the survey showed the driveway to be located
within the legal description of Parcel 1, when it was actually
located within the legal description of Parcel 2.

Although

Gregorys intended to sell the driveway to Grahns, they were relying
on the erroneous survey.

Gregorys did not intend to convey any

more acreage to Grahns than they did convey because doing so
subtracts essential acreage from the other parcel, leaving it
unbuildable under the zoning regulations. When Gregorys agreed to
subdivide the land and sell Parcel 1 to Grahns, both the Grahns and
the Gregorys relied upon the survey and corresponding survey
stakes.

The trial court correctly found that 1.11 acres was what

Grahns accepted and Gregorys sold to them.

Unbeknownst to anyone,

the conditions of subdivision had not been met, and therefore the
contract would not have been made had the mistake not occurred.
The trial court erroneously reformed the Grahn deed to include
acreage from Parcel 2 because that acreage contained the driveway
the Grahns thought they were receiving.

The very sale to Grahns

itself depended upon the survey.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /jh day of January, 1991.
WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER & SWINTON, P.C.

J^fifeyHK. \Woodl5tfry
J^^C"
AlAonTQ^foa: Defendants/"'^
j
A p p e l l a n t s Bradshaws
^
^

Rufesell S. Walker
Attorney for Defendants/
A p p e l l a n t s Bradshaws
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Appendix A

and that this was not merely a case of mistake in a legal
description which did not reflect the intentions of the parties.
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT
TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
(Reply to Respondents' Brief,
"Statement of the Case, Section B)
Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn have objected to the facts
which Defendant Gregory set forth in his brief which cited to a
document on record in this case entitled "Stipulated Facts".
The attorneys for all the parties signed the Stipulation and
it is part of the record herein.

Plaintiffs'/Respondents'

attorney contends in their brief that the Stipulation was to be
used for the preliminary injunction hearing only, and that the
Trial Court, in its Order Granting Injunction, "acknowledged the
limited purpose for the Stipulation"-

The Order stated only that

the Court had received a written Stipulation of Facts "setting
forth stipulated facts for the purposes of this hearing".

It did

not say, "for the limited purposes of this hearing" or "for the
purposes of this hearing only", or that the document was not to
be used again.

Further, Plaintiffs/Respondents objected to the

use of that document in their objection to the Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment, but the Court did not respond to that
objection in its Order denying that Motion.

Defendant Gregory

believes that the Stipulation of Facts, and thus the facts they
set forth in their brief citing to it, are not inconsistent with
the evidence and the rest of the record as to the relevant facts
of this case.

However, to eliminate as much confusion to the

4

Court as possible, we further clarify and support the relevant
facts as follows:
1.

In 19 30, Albert and Carolyn Eccles acquired by deed a

parcel of property known as the "Brookburn property".
(Transcript, p. 416, L. 1-10)
2.

In 1960 or 1961, Carolyn Eccles and her husband Albert

divided the property and deeded part of that land, retaining
approximately 1.67 acres. The Trust is not aware of any requests
made during that time to legally subdivide the property.
(Transcript, p. 417, L. 16-20; p. 288, 289)
3.

In 1978, the Eccles conveyed the property to Harold L.

Gregory, Trustee for and on behalf of the Marital and Family
Trust of the Albert L. Eccles Family.

(Transcript, p. 286, L. 4-

7; p. 287, L. 7-9)
4.

In 1984, Defendant Gregory divided the existing 1.67

acre parcel of land at 2811 Brookburn Road to create two separate
contiguous parcels so that Barbara Danielson, a beneficiary of
the Trust, could build a home on the smaller parcel being divided
off.

The Defendant Gregory hired Scott McNeil of McNeil

Engineering ("Defendant McNeil") to survey the property and
divide it into separate parcels.

(Transcript, p. 289, L. 16-20;

p. 418, L. 11 - p. 419, L. 5)
5.

Barbara Danielson, a beneficiary of the Trust,

instructed Defendant McNeil to do a topographic survey to divide
off and create a buildable parcel of at least one-half acre
(hereinafter "Parcel 2") in the southeast corner off the
5

driveway, using the driveway as a boundary. (Transcript, p. 222,
L. 7-21; p. 237, L. 23 - p. 238, L. 3; p. 418, L. 11 - p. 419, L.
10)
6.

Mr. McNeil understood and was instructed that Defendant

Gregory intended for him to divide off an available lot,
consisting of at least one-half acre with the driveway as the
boundary.
7.

(Transcript, p. 237, L. 23 - p. 238, L. 3)
In instructing McNeil, Defendant Gregory intended for

Parcel 2 to contain at least one-half acre because of zoning
requirements in that area that required a one-half acre parcel in
order to build. (Transcript, p. 300, L. 11-15; p. 422, L. 20-23)
8.

When McNeil Engineering did the physical survey, they

made an error with their instruments while separating off the
one-half acre parcel.
9.

(Transcript, p. 227 - 228)

Consequently, the written survey conformed with the

intentions of the parties, showing the southeast side of the
driveway to be a boundary (thus making the driveway part of the
1.11 acre Parcel 1 ) , and showing Parcel 2 to contain .56 acre.
(See Survey, Exhibit 1-P of Record, Addendum A hereto)
10.

Since Defendant McNeil had made a mistake while doing

the physical survey, the written survey had incorporated that
mistake and even though the survey showed the driveway on Parcel
1, in reality it was within the confines of Parcel 2.

(See

Survey, Exhibit 19-D of record, which was the correct survey
later done of both parcels).
11.

Defendant Gregory represented to the Grahns that a
6

half-acre parcel had been separated off by survey, and that they
could either purchase the entire piece as one parcel, or they
could just purchase the one-acre parcel.

(Transcript, p. 57, L.

2-9)
12.

While showing the property to prospective buyers,

Gregory, through his agent, Noel Taylor, represented that the
property could be purchased in one parcel for $345,000.00 or
could be separated according to the survey stakes and sold as two
parcels, for approximately $270,000.00 for Parcel 1 and
approximately $75,000.00 for Parcel 2.

(Transcript p. 27, L. 23-

p. 28 L. 2; p. 45, L. 5-14)
13.

The Grahns decided they could not afford the whole

parcel, so they submitted an Earnest Money Agreement to Defendant
Gregory on Parcel 1 with a first right of refusal on Parcel 2.
That agreement was prepared by Grahns' attorney. (Transcript, p.
59, L. 19-25; p. 99, L. 12-17; p. 7, L. 16-24; Exh. 2-P of
record; Transcript, p. 113, L. 22- p. 114 L. 20)
14.

At the time the Defendant Gregory contracted with

Grahns to sell Parcel 1, the Defendant Gregory did not intend to
convey more acreage to the Grahns than he did convey by his
contract, yet his representation to Grahns that the driveway was
included with Parcel 1 was based on his erroneous assumption,
while relying on the survey, that the driveway was situated
within the 1.11 acre parcel which he were conveying. (Transcript,
p. 208, L. 20 - p.209, L. 11; p. 300, L. 18 - p. 301, L. 9)
15.

The Grahns relied on the placement of the survey
7

boundary stakes which had been placed in error, as well as on the
representations of the Defendant Gregory, based on that same
survey, in believing that they were purchasing a 1.11 acre parcel
of land which contained the driveway. (Transcript, p. 56, L. 22p. 57, L. 9; p. 86, L. 8-13; p. 139)
16.

When Grahns and Defendant Gregory and Mary Ethyl

Gregory negotiated their contract, they were all relying on the
erroneous survey. (Transcript, p. 94 L. 8-13)

Mrs. Grahn

testified she was relying on that survey even with the first
offer they made.

(Transcript, p. 97, L... 18-21)

17. Defendant Gregory on behalf of the Trust intended to
divide the property into two parcels and intended that the
driveway remain with the parcel containing the house. However,
his decision to divide the property at all times was based on the
survey which showed he had a buildable, .56 acre parcel southeast
of the driveway.

Had he known this was a mistaken assumption, he

never would have divided the property, and so would never have
made this contract to sell Grahns Parcel 1 separately.
(Transcript, p. 209, L. 5-11; p. 209, L- 1-4; p. 301, L. 17-21;
p. 422, L. 10-23; p. 316, L. 5-17)
18.

Grahns were told that the division of the property was

based on the survey.

(Transcript, p. 94, L. 8-13)

The Grahns

were conscious of the division of the property during their
negotiations because they could not afford the entire piece.
(Transcript p. 99, L. 12-17)
19.

Defendant McNeil prepared a legal description of Parcel
8

2 as part of his survey of Parcel 2.

(Transcript, p. 419, L. 18-

21; p. 452, L. 24 - p. 453, L. 20).
20-

On or about March 18, 1986, Grahns and Defendant

Gregory entered into an Earnest Money Agreement for the purchase
of Parcel 1, consisting of 1.11 acres. The amount of acreage
they were purchasing appeared twice on the agreement, once on the
first page of the document and once in the legal description
attached to it.

Their agreement also included (1) an option to

Grahns of first right of refusal on Parcel 2 (referred to five
times in the option as the "one-half acre" parcel), and (2) for a
15-foot restrictive aesthetic and geologic easement on Parcel 2
across the 15 feet nearest the driveway. (See Earnest Money
Agreement, Exhibit 2-P of Record)
21.

The Trial Court found that 1.11 acres was the acreage

which both Grahns and Gregory accepted as that which was being
bought and sold.

(Findings of Fact No. 13; Record p. 534)

22. Grahns accepted the existing survey upon purchasing
Parcel 1.

Mrs. Grahn testified that at one point she did request

a survey from Mrs. Gregory, but it was not at a time when she
could get it, and after that Mrs. Grahn did not worry about
getting a copy because the survey stakes were clearly laid out.
(Transcript, p. 303, L. 1-8; p. 82, L. 15-19; p. 139)
23.

Grahns wanted a warranty by Defendant Gregory that the

property was legally divided.

Defendant Gregory had been

receiving tax notices and paying taxes on the parcels separately
for two years and understood that to mean the land was legally
9

divided, and thus made the warranty that, based upon his
knowledge of the county records, the land was legally divided.
(Transcript, p. 190, L. 5 - p. 191, L. 3)
24.

Josephine Grahn obtained the legal description for

Parcel 1 from the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office which legal
description the County presumably prepared from the legal
description McNeil prepared for Parcel 2.
25.

(Transcript, p. 84)

On or about August 1, 1986, Grahns and Defendant

Gregory closed on the transaction for the sale of Parcel 1.
(Transcript, p. 63, L. 23 - p. 64, L. 5)
26.

The legal description for Parcel 1 contained no calls

to the driveway.
27.

(Transcript, p. 465, L. 3-7)

There was no overlap in the deed descriptions for

Parcels 1 and 2. (Transcript, p. 239, L. 1-5; p. 327, L. 1-13; p.
197, L. 4-10)
28.

On September 1, 1986, Defendants Bradshaw entered into

an Earnest Money Agreement with the Defendant Gregory to purchase
Parcel 2.
29.

(See Earnest Money Agreement, Exhibit 7-P of Record)
On September 1, 1986, Defendant Gregory gave written

notice to Grahns of his intention to sell Parcel 2 to Bradshaws,
and extended the right of first refusal.

(See Exhibit 7-P of

Record)
30.

Grahns did not exercise their right of first refusal to

purchase Parcel 2, and when the option expired, Grahns told
Defendant Gregory to go ahead with the Bradshaw sale.
(Transcript, p. 69, L. 21 - p. 70, L. 9)
10

31.

Bradshaws relied on McNeil's survey in tendering their

September 1, 1986 offer which was accepted by Gregory after
Grahns failed to exercise their option to purchase Parcel 2.
(Transcript, p. 372, L. 11 - p. 373, L. 20; p. 397, L. 21 - p.
398, L. 15)
32.

After Grahns received notice of the Bradshaws' offer

and before their option expired, Josephine Grahn contacted
Christi Bradshaw by phone and informed her that it looked as if
Grahns were not going to be able to exercise their option, but
informed Christi Bradshaw that before building on Parcel 2,
Bradshaws would need to subdivide the property because it was not
legally subdivided.
33.

(Transcript, p. 375)

Shortly thereafter Defendant Gregory and Defendants

Bradshaw applied for and went through the subdivision process for
Parcel 2 and the subdivision was approved. (Transcript, p. 410,
L. 1-8; p. 372, L. 11 - p. 373, L. 9; p. 167, L. 20 -p. 168, L.
3)
34.

Salt Lake County Zoning ordinances require parcels of

land to contain at least one half acre in the zone in which the
property in question is located.

If Parcel 2 is left with less

than one-half acre, buildability is also questionable because of
the grade and terrain.

The owner would have to apply to the

Zoning and Planning Commission for a variance, if the Defendant
Gregory is left with less than a half acre, and there is no
guarantee a variance would be granted.

In fact, it took a long

time for Zoning to approve a permit for Bradshaws' existing house
11

plan on the property because of the Zoning Commissions' concern
over the steepness of the slope on the property*

(Transcript, p.

264, L. 1-25; p. 265, L. 1-15; p. 268, L. 6 - p. 269, L. 2; p.
185, L. 22 - 186, L. 6)
35.

On October 11, 19 86, Dean Bradshaw discovered by

measurement on Parcel 2 that the driveway was apparently not
located where indicated and was instead located within the
acreage he had purchased for Parcel 2. Measuring beyond the
driveway, there was inadequate land between the driveway and the
southeastern boundary of the property to locate his home,
Bradshaws immediately advised Defendant Gregory of the problem
and Gregory contacted Defendant McNeil. (Transcript, p. 169, L.
20 - p. 171, L. 9; p. 381, L. 14 - p. 383, L. 4)
36.

Defendant Gregory did not contact the Grahns

immediately about the mistake that had been discovered until
approximately one day after the closing on the Bradshaw property,
because until the closing the Defendant Gregory did not
understand the magnitude of the problem; it was at that time they
thought they understood the effect of the mistake; and they
obtained counsel to get legal advice on what to do. Additionally,
Gregory felt that the Earnest Money Agreement he had signed with
Bradshaws was a legally binding contract, and that therefore he
had to go through with the closing. (Transcript, p. 175, L. 23 p. 177, L. 9)
37.

On the day after the closing with Bradshaws, Defendant

Gregory gave notice to Grahns of the error and offered possible
12

solutions to the problem created by the mistake.

(Exhibit 8-P of

Record)
38.

The Trial Court recognized that the Earnest Money

Agreement between Defendant Gregory and Bradshaws was a legal and
binding agreement. (Transcript, p. 176)
39.

On October 23, 1986, McNeil prepared a revised drawing

showing what he believed to be the relationship of the Private
Drive to Parcel 1 and Parcel 2.
40.

(See Exhibit 9-P of Record)

Defendant McNeil subsequently prepared a revised survey

of both parcels, showing the correct boundaries.
19-D of Record)

(Note:

(See Exhibit

In Appellants' previous Brief, Fact No.

40, these Defendants erroneously referred to that survey as
Exhibit 12-P.)
41.

Addendum A attached to this brief is a copy of the

pertinent portion of Exhibit 1-P of the record, the original
survey prepared by McNeil, showing Parcel 2 and what the parties
believed was the nature of the property including the location of
the road at the time they entered into the agreement.

Only this

pertinent and relevant portion of the oversized exhibit has been
photocopied as Addendum "Aw for this brief so that the Addendum
maintains the scale of the trial exhibit of 1 inch equals 20
feet.

Addendum B is a copy of the pertinent part of Exhibit 19-D

of the record, the revised survey, showing where the road is
actually located on the property.

Again, only this pertinent and

relevant part of the oversized exhibit has been photocopied as
Addendum B to maintain the same scale of 1 inch equals 20 feet as
13

shown on Exhibit 19-D at trial.

Zoning ordinances require a 30

foot front yard set back from the road and a 10 foot side yard
set back.

Additionally, there is a 15 foot easement along the

Southeastern edge of the driveway which Gregory granted to
Grahns.

According to the zoning requirements, the 15-foot

easement and the revised survey, if the contract is reformed
pursuant to the District Court's ruling, the buildable space on
Parcel 2 is greatly reduced and is located on the steepest
terrain on Parcel 2.

(See Exh. 1-P and 19-D; Transcript p. 242,

L. 4-13)
42.

Addendum C is a copy of page A-2 of Exhibit 18-D which

was the drawing made by Bradshaws' architect showing the
steepness of the slope of Parcel 2, the location of the slope in
Parcel 2 and where the home Bradshaws designed was to be located
on the property.
43.

(See Exh. 18-D)

Addenda D and E are full-sized copies of Exhibits 1-P

and 19-D, respectively, of which Addenda A and B relevant parts,
respectively.
44.

Plaintiffs Grahn did not sell their prior home until

March 1, 1987, which was three months after this lawsuit was
commenced.

(Transcript p. 116, L. 15-24)

They did not move into

the home on Parcel 1 until some seven months after this lawsuit
was filed, and most of the time and money they spent in repairing
and/or remodeling the home on Parcel 1 was spent after this
lawsuit was filed.

(Transcript, p. 115-116)
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45.

Plaintiffs Grahn and Defendant Gregory had an informal

understanding that since Grahns had "gotten a good deal" on their
purchase of Parcel 1, and that if at a later time they could
purchase Parcel 2, Grahns were going to pay higher than value for
Parcel 2 to even things out in the long run.

(Transcript p. 125)

ARGUMENT
I
THERE WAS ONLY ONE MISTAKE MADE BY THE
PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT IN QUESTION - MISTAKEN
ASSUMPTIONS BASED UPON AN ERRONEOUS SURVEY
(In Reply to Point I of Respondents' Brief)
Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn, in their brief, assert that
there were two distinct mistakes made by the parties, one mutual
and one unilateral.

The facts, however, clearly establish the

mistake in this transaction was a reliance placed on an erroneous
survey.

All parties relied on the survey which was erroneous and

as a result all parties to the transaction misunderstood the
nature of the property.

As a result of the mistaken survey, the

parties made a series of errors.

The Plaintiffs/Respondents

Grahn thought they were buying 1.11 acres which included a road.
The Defendants/Appellants Bradshaw thought they had at least a
half acre not including a road.

These were in fact

representations made by the Defendant/Appellant Gregory based
upon a survey he had previously obtained from Defendant McNeil.
The representations were flawed because the survey was flawed.
The legal description obtained by Grahns was flawed because the
survey was flawed because it didn't include the road.
15

The legal

Appendix B

Q

AND ALSO THE HILLSIDE «^Ui_u

UL

*-» .-..-*««.*

^W.^^.N.-

WITH RESPECT TO EXCAVATION AND WHAT WOULD NEED TO BE DONE
ON THAT; IS THAT CORRECT?
A

THAT IS CORRECT.

Q

NOW, IS IT MY UNDERSTANDING THAT YOU SAID A

VARIANCE COULD BE ATTAINED?
A

I DIDN'T SAY IT COULD.

THEY MAY APPLY AND MAYBE

IT WILL BE APPROVED; BUT THAT IS A WAY.OF PROCEEDING WITH
A REDUCTION OF AREA.
Q

OKAY.

I STAND CORRECTED.

BUT THE BUILDABILITY

OF THE LOT WOULD STILL BE AN ISSUE THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE
APPROVED; IS THAT CORRECT?
A

THAT IS CORRECT.
MR. WOODBURY:
THE COURT:

THANK YOU.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS.

MR. WALKER?
CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. WALKER:
Q

JUST A COUPLE QUESTIONS, MR. REYNOLDS.
YOU STATED THAT THERE WAS NO BUILDING PERMIT IN

THE FILE, BUT REALLY A BUILDING PERMIT WOULD NOT BE
LOCATED IN THAT FILE; IS THAT CORRECT?
A

THAT'S CORRECT.

THE BUILDING PERMIT DOES NOT

GO IN SUBDIVISION FILES.
Q

WE'RE REFERRING TO A BUILDING PERMIT FOR .56

ACRES; IS THAT CORRECT?
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defendant's credibility under Rule 609(a).
9. Defendant additionally complains that during
crossexamination, the prosecutor questioned him
concerning his unemployment. An appellate court
has discretion as to the nature and extent of the
opinions it renders and we need not "address in
writing each and every argument, issue, or claim
raised and properly before us on appeal." State v.
Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989); see State v.
Jones, 783 P.2d 560, 565 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Defendant did not object to this questioning and we
decline to specifically address this claim because it is
not a substantial issue.
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OPINION

BILLINGS, JUDGE:
Appellant Herold L. Gregory ("Gregory"),
Trustee for and on behalf of the Marital and
Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles Family
Trust ("Trusts"), appeals from a district court
order entered after a four-day trial reforming
a land sale contract with appellees, Allen R.
and Josephine M. Grahn ("Grahns"), and
rescinding the sale of a contiguous parcel of
land to appellants Dean and Christi Bradshaw
("Bradshaws"). The Bradshaws also appeal the
reformation of the Grahn/Gregory contract.
The Grahns cross-appeal, claiming the trial
UTAH

court erred in (1) ordering them to pay for the
additional acreage included after reformation,
and (2) refusing to award attorney fees to
them. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
We recite the facts in a light favorable to
the decision of the fact finder. See Security
State Bank v. Broadhead, 734 P.2d 469, 47071 (Utah 1987); Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d
1226, 1227 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
This dispute involves a parcel of land,
owned by the Trusts, located at 2811 Brookburn Road in Salt Lake County. Before it was
subdivided, the property was an estate consisting of a home with private drive access.
In 1984, the Trusts hired a surveyor to
subdivide a one-half acre plot to be deeded
to Barbara Danielson, a beneficiary of the
Trusts. Danielson, with the knowledge of
Gregory, instructed the surveyor to locate the
one-half acre parcel in the southeast corner
and to stake such a parcel "to the south and
east off the road, us[ing] the road as the
boundary." The larger remaining parcel was
designated "parcel one" at trial, while the onehalf acre parcel was designated "parcel two."
When the surveyor prepared the legal description of parcel two, he made a four-degree
error in describing a turn. Thus, the legal
description of parcel two mistakenly included
a part of the private drive which the Trusts
and the surveyor intended to be included in
parcel one.
Danielson decided qot to build on parcel
two and deeded the property back to the
Trusts. Gregory then listed both parcels with a
broker. Gregory directed the broker to advise
potential buyers the survey stakes placed along
the east side of the private driveway formed
the boundary between the two parcels and to
assure potential buyers the private drive providing access to the existing home was part of
parcel one.
The broker showed the property to the
Grahns and advised them that either or both
of the two parcels could be purchased. The
broker removed snow from the survey stakes
on the south and east side of the private drive
to identify the boundary line between the two
parcels and to confirm the private drive was
part of par eel one.
The Grahns sought assurances as to the
physical boundaries of the parcels on numerous occasions and explicitly stated they
wanted the private drive as part of parcel one.
The Grahns were not concerned about the
acreage of parcel one, but with the physical
boundaries of the property as identified by the
survey stakes. The broker testified at trial that
because of the unique nature of the estate, it
would be unusual for the parties to be concerned with the acreage rather than the physical
boundaries of the property.
Both the Grahns and Gregory understood
and intended at the time the sale was negotiated that the private drive would be included
CE REPORTS
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in the sale of parcel one to the Grahns.
After determining to purchase parcel one,
the Grahns sought a legal description for the
parcel to include in the Earnest Money Agreement. Josephine Grahn telephoned the Gregorys requesting a legal description and was
referred to the tax notices. Josephine Grahn
then went to the Salt Lake County Recorder's
Office and obtained a legal description. Apparently, the Recorder's Office had used the
Danielson deed on parcel two as a basis for
the legal description for parcel one. Thus, the
Recorder's Office subtracted the .56 acres in
parcel two from the 1.67 acreage of the total
property and included an 1.11 acre figure in
the legal description of parcel one. As a result
of the mistake on the original survey, the
Recorder's legal description of parcel one was
not in conformity with the physical staked
boundaries of parcel one. Neither the Grahns
nor Gregory were aware of the mistaken legal
description at this time.
The Earnest Money Agreement recited the
1.11 acre figure and the mistaken legal description, but also provided for an easement for
an aesthetic break between the properties
which would extend into parcel two "from any
point within fifteen (15) feet of the existing
drive which separates the two lots ...."
The Grahns and Gregory closed the sale of
parcel one on August 1, 1986. The legal description in the deed for the property did not
include the 1.11 acre figure.1 The Grahns also
received a right of first refusal to purchase
parcel two.
On September 1, 1986, Gregory entered into
an Earnest Money Agreement with the Bradshaws for the purchase of parcel two. The
agreement provided the sale would close by
September 15, 1986. Also on September 1,
Gregory informed the Grahns of his intention
to sell the property and extended them the
right of first refusal on parcel two in accordance with the option contained in the Grahn/
Gregory Earnest Money Agreement on parcel
one. Under the Earnest Money Agreement, the
Grahns had seven days to exercise the option.
In the event the Grahns did not exercise the
option, the agreement provided that Gregory
could sell parcel two within 90 days under the
same terms and conditions offered to the
Grahns under the option. If, however, those
terms changed, Gregory was required to offer
the Grahns another option term.
The Grahns did not exercise their right of
first refusal and, when the option expired, told
Gregory to proceed with the sale of parcel two
to the Bradshaws.
On October 11, 1986, Dean Bradshaw discovered the private drive was apparently
located within the legal description of parcel
two. The Bradshaws informed Gregory.
Gregory contacted the surveyor. The surveyor
admitted his mistake and completed another
survey which correctly placed the private drive
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within parcel one and yet still provided onehalf acre for parcel two in accordance with his
original instructions. However, Gregory rejected this survey because the Bradshaws could
not construct the house they had designed on
the re-drawn parcel. The surveyor was then
instructed to draft a new survey without reference to the private drive as the boundary
between the parcels.
Prior to closing the sale of parcel two,
Gregory gave the Bradshaws the opportunity
to avoid their agreement, but they refused. On
November 20, 1986, Gregory and the Bradshaws closed the sale of parcel two using the
original mistaken legal description. At that
time, Gregory and the Bradshaws entered into
another agreement which provided: "In the
event that buyer cannot obtain the full .56
acre according to the legal description, seller
agrees to nullify sale and refund purchase
price."
Gregory did not inform the Grahns of the
mistaken legal description until after closing
the sale of parcel two with the Bradshaws.
Gregory then informed the Grahns of the
mistake and offered to either rescind their
agreement or to relocate the private drive
within the boundaries of the new parcel.
The Grahns learned the Bradshaws planned
to immediately begin construction on their
new home on parcel two. The Grahns, therefore, obtained a temporary restraining order
to block construction and commenced this
lawsuit seeking reformation of their deed to
include the private drive as part of parcel one.
The temporary restraining order was converted
to a preliminary injunction pending resolution
of this dispute.
The trial court, after a five-day bench
trial, ordered reformation of the Grahns'
deed, finding the deed did not conform to the
agreement between Gregory and the Grahns to
include the private drive in parcel one. In
addition, the trial court ordered the Grahns to
pay $12,604.06 as the fair market value of the
land in excess of 1.11 acres which would be
included in the reformed parcel. The trial
court also rescinded the agreement between
Gregory and the Bradshaws for the sale of
parcel two. The court awarded costs to the
Grahns, but did not award them attorney fees.
Gregory appeals, claiming the trial court
erred in ordering reformation rather than
rescission of the sale of parcel one. The Bradshaws appeal, claiming the court erred in
determining they were not bona fide purchasers, thus, cutting off the Grahns' reformation
rights and, in addition, that the trial court
erred in denying them damages for an unlawful injunction which caused them to lose the
benefit of their bargain with a material supplier. The Grahns cross-appeal, claiming the
trial court erred in ordering them to pay for
the additional acreage and in its denial of their
request for attorney fees.
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MUTUAL MISTAKE-REFORMATION
OR RESCISSION?
Gregory initially argues the trial court erred
in reforming the sale of parcel one to include
the private drive. Although he concedes the
parties both mistakenly believed the private
drive was included in parcel one, he contends
that under the circumstances the proper
remedy was rescission of the sale, not reformation of the contract. Gregory argues the
parties never agreed to the contract as reformed because both parties understood that
only 1.11 acres were included in parcel one
and this was an essential term of the contract
as it left parcel two with the .56 acre necessary
for his sale of parcel two to the Bradshaws.
Under certain circumstances, courts may
reform an agreement to reflect the intent of
the parties. Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§155 (1981)2 states that w[w]here a writing
that evidences or embodies an agreement in
whole or in part fails to express the agreement
because of a mistake of both parties as to the
contents or effect of the writing, the court
may at the request of a party reform the
writing to express the agreement, except to the
extent that rights of third parties such as good
faith purchasers for value will be unfairly
affected. "3
The Utah Supreme Court set out the criteria
which must be met before reformation is
permissible in Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d
1271 (Utah 1984), a case similar to the one
before us. The court stated:
Reformation of a deed is a proceeding in equity and is appropriate
where the terms of the written instrument are mistaken in that they
do not show the true intent of the
agreement between the parties.
There are two grounds for reformation of such an agreement: mutual
mistake of the parties and ignorance
or mistake by one party, coupled
with fraud by the other party.
This case is a clear case of mutual
mistake by the parties. The defendant and all subsequent purchasers
except plaintiff agreed that the
understanding and the intent of the
parties to the various deeds was that
the fence line be the boundary. It
was only due to a mistake made by
the drafter of the deed as to the
metes and bounds described that the
deed did not conform to the intent
of the parties. Reformation is
clearly appropriate where there is a
variance between the written deed
and the true agreement of the
parties caused by a draftsman.
I. at 1273 (footnotes omitted). See aiso Guaran State Bank v. Stangl, 11% P.2d 1, 4-
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7 (Utah 1989); Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770,
772 (Utah 1985).'
Reformation is appropriate where the
written instrument is not in conformity with
the parties' agreement, not where the parties
have failed to agree. We will not make a
contract for the parties which they did not
make, only reform a contract to reflect the
agreement they actually made.5
The trial court specifically found Gregory
had told the Grahns that the private drive was
included in parcel one. In addition, the court
found that both parties understood the private
drive was included in parcel one and the legal
description did not conform to the parties'
agreement. There is also evidence that the
parties were not concerned with the size of
parcel one, but only with the physical staked
boundaries of the property.6 We note that we
review the trial judge's findings of fact under
the standard set forth in Rule 52 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure: "Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P.
52(a). This "clearly erroneous" standard
applies whether the case is one in equity, as is
this case, or one at law. See Reid v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah
1989); Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548,
551(Utah Ct. App. 1987). The trial court's
findings are amply supported by the evidence.
Only Gregory's self-serving statements
support his argument that the acreage included
in parcel one was essential to the parties'
agreement. The Utah Supreme Court has
previously held that when a party requesting
rescission offers only self-serving statements
concerning the materiality of the mistake, that
testimony is insufficient to support an order
for rescission. See Kiahtipes v. Mills, 649 P.2d
9,13-14 (Utah 1982).
We agree with the trial court that the parties
intended the private drive to be included in
parcel one and the legal description did not
conform to those intentions and thus conclude
the trial court correctly reformed the deed of
parcel one to reflect the parties' actual agreement.
UNILATERAL MISTAKE
As a secondary claim, Gregory asserts that
his unilateral mistake that there would be
sufficient acreage for the Bradshaws to build
on parcel two is grounds to rescind the sale of
parcel one to the Grahns.
The standard for determining whether rescission is the proper remedy for a unilateral
mistake is as follows:
1. The mistake must be of so grave
a consequence that to enforce the
contract as actually made would be
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unconscionable.
2. The matter as to which the
mistake was made must relate to a
material feature of the contract.
3. Generally the mistake must have
occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary diligence by the
party making the mistake.
4. It must be possible to give relief
by way of rescission without serious
prejudice to the other party except
the loss of his bargain. In other
words, it must be possible to put
him in status quo.
B & A Assocs. v. L.A. Young Sons Constr.
Co., 139 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 12 (Utah 1990)
(quoting John Call Eng'g v. Manti City Corp.,
743 P.2d 1205, 1209-10 (Utah 1987)); see also
Ashworth v. Charlesworth, 119 Utah 650,
231 P.2d 724, 727 (1951).
The appellant must marshal all the evidence
which supports the trial court's findings and
show that, in the light most favorable to the
finding, it is against the "'clear weight of the
evidence," and is thus clearly erroneous when
applied to the foregoing legal principles. See
Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d
1222, 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); see also
Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson,
782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); Scharf v.
BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
Gregory has failed to marshal the evidence
in support of the trial court's findings and
then to demonstrate that the trial court's
findings were clearly erroneous. 7 Thus, we will
not disturb the trial court's reformation of the
deed. 8
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without actual or constructive knowledge of
facts sufficient to put him on notice of the
complainant's equity." Blodgett v. Marsh, 590
P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added).
Further, the Utah Supreme Court, in defining
notice, has stated that

j

|
j
j

BONA FIDE PURCHASERS
The Bradshaws contend they are bona fide
purchasers of parcel two and thus cut off the
Grahns' right to reform the deed on parcel
one. 9 The Bradshaws admit they knew of the
mistaken description before the sale of parcel
two was completed, but argue they submitted
their Earnest Money Agreement on parcel two
without notice of the mistaken legal description and consequent problems and since the
Earnest Money Agreement is a binding contract, see Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802,
805 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), they are bona fide
purchasers. The Grahns, on the other hand,
argue the relevant time for determining bona
fide purchaser status is at the time of
"purchase," i.e., at the closing of the sale.
In Utah, it is clear that a bona fide purchaser can cut off the right of reformation. See
Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271, 1273
(Utah 1984) ("the right of reformation of a
deed can be cut off by purchase of the property by a bona fide purchaser for value
without notice of the mistake ").
The case law implies the essential time to
measure knowledge is at the time of the actual
sale. A bona fide purchaser is "one who takes
UTAH ADVAN

[ajctual or constructive notice
defeats a subsequent purchaser's
interest. A subsequent purchaser
must therefore, show that he had
no actual notice, i.e., no personal
knowledge, of a prior conveyance
or that the prior conveyance did not
impart constructive notice, i.e., was
not recorded before his conveyance
in the same land was recorded.
Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Wasatch
Bank, 734 P.2d 904, 906 n.2 (Utah 1986) (per
curiam) (emphasis added). See also Diversified
Equities, Inc. v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
739 P.2d 113., 1136 (Utah 1987) (if a subsequent purchaser has information or facts
which would put a prudent person upon
inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to
actual knowledge, an unrecorded conveyance
is not void as against that subsequent purchaser).
The Bradshaws discovered the mistake in
the legal description more than one month
before they closed on the sale of parcel two
with Gregory. Gregory and the Bradshaws
further agreed in writing that the sale would
be nullified if the conveyance could not be as
planned.-We agree with the trial court that the
Bradshaws were not bona fide purchasers of
parcel two. 10
PAYMENT FOR ADDITIONAL ACREAGE
The Grahns appeal the trial court's order
requiring them to pay for the additional
acreage in the reformed deed, claiming the
acreage included in parcel one was not a basis
for the bargain between the Grahns and
Gregory. They claim the agreement was that
parcel one as circumscribed by the staked
boundaries was to be sold for the agreed price.
We agree.
The Earnest Money Agreement drafted by
the Grahns recited the 1.11 acre figure, but
also stated that the private drive divided the
two parcels. The deed to parcel one did not
recite the size of the property. We do not find
that this mistaken designation of the size of
parcel one was central to the parties' bargain.
The trial court stated in Finding 13: "The
description to Parcel One was obtained by
plaintiffs Grahn from the Salt Lake County
Recorder[']s Office. The description designated Parcel One as being 1.11 acres and accepted by the trustee and defendants Grahn as
acreage to be sold and purchased."
This finding conflicts with the trial court's
Finding of Fact 14 which states Gregory and
the Grahns understood the private drive to be
REPORTS
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boundary and that the technical descripi did not conform to the intents of the
ties. We therefore conclude that Finding of
t 13 is clearly erroneous in light of the
lence and its inconsistency with the court's
er findings and conclusions. The trial
rt's order requiring the Grahns to pay for
additional acreage included is therefore
ersed.
ATTORNEY FEES
The Grahns also appeal the trial court's
lial of their request for attorney fees, claitig they should be awarded attorney fees
:ause the evidence demonstrated that
egory breached the option agreement, and
t for that breach, this lawsuit would not
ve resulted.
In Utah, parties may recover attorney fees
ly if provided for by contract or authorized
statute. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken,
4 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); see also Arnica
ut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 965
Itah Ct. App. 1989). Further, w[i]f provided
r by contract, the award of attorney fees is
lowed only in accordance with the terms of
e contract." Bracken, 764 P.2d at 988.
The contractual language in the Earnest
toney Agreement which provides for attorney
es states:
Both parties agree that, should
either party default in any of the
covenants or agreements herein
contained, the defaulting party shall
pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorneys' fee,
which may arise or accrue from
enforcing or terminating this agreement, or in pursuing any remedy
provided hereunder or by applicable
law, w h e t h e r such remedy is
pursued by filing suit or otherwise.
The Earnest Money Agreement between the
3rahns and Gregory included a first right of
efusal option on parcel two. The contractual
anguage of that option provided:
Should Buyer fail to exercise
Buyers' option under this provision, then Seller shall have the right
to sell the property within ninety
(90) days of the date of the expiration of Sellers' said option on terms
and conditions no more favorable
than those originally offered under
this paragraph to Buyer. Should the
offer be amended making the terms
more favorable, or should the said
offer fail and a new offer be received, then the said amendment or
offer shall be, once again, subject
to the terms of this provision. The
terms of this provision shall survive
the closing of the purchase of the
property which is the subject of the
UTAH

main Agreement.
The Grahns contend that after they declined
to exercise their option to purchase parcel two,
Gregory offered the Bradshaws more favorable terms and therefore Gregory breached the
option agreement when he did not offer the
option to the Grahns again. The Grahns assert
that the more favorable terms are the extension of the closing date past September 15 and
the additional agreement providing that if
Gregory could not convey the entire .56 acres,
the agreement was void.
The trial court did not make a specific
finding concerning the cause of action for
breach of the option. The court did find,
however, that the w[t]rustee thereafter offered
plaintiffs a first right of refusal to purchase
Parcel Two which was not exercised by plaintiff." While not stating so directly, we conclude the trial court inferentially found no
breach of the option agreement. Furthermore,
the issue of this lawsuit concerns the amount
of property the parties intended to convey by
the sale of parcel one and is not the result of
any breach of the option to purchase parcel
two. Thus, we find that there was no default
of the option agreement and the trial court
correctly concluded that attorney fees should
not be awarded.
CONCLUSION
We hold the trial court correctly reformed
the land sale contract on parcel one because a
mistake in the legal description included in the
deed did not reflect the parties' agreement.
We conclude the trial court was correct in
finding the Bradshaws were not bona fide
purchasers of parcel two and thus could not
cut off the Grahns' right to reformation.
Additionally, we affirm the trial court's conclusion that the Grahns were not entitled to
attorney fees as this dispute did not result
from a breach of the option agreement.
However, we reverse the trial court's order
requiring the Grahns to pay for the additional
acreage included in the reformed deed as the
facts clearly support a finding that the parties
agreed to purchase and sell parcel one based
on the physical boundaries of the parcel and
decided on a price for that parcel without
regard to the acreage of parcel one.
Judith M. Billings, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
1. In fact, the Warranty Deed from Gregory to the
Grahns included a legal description different from
that in the Earnest Mone> Agreement. The source
of this legal description is unknown. The legal description in the Trust Deed from the Grahns to
Gregory was identical to the one in the Warranty
Deed. Neither instrument recited the 1.11 acre
figure.
REPORTS
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2. Gregory asserts the applicable
section is section 152, which states that
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Restatement

[wjhere a mistake of both parties at the
time the contract was made as to a basic
assumption on which the contract was
made and has a material affect on the
agreed exchange of performances, the
contract is voidable by the adversely
affected party unless he bears the risk of
mistake....
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §152 (1981).
The Restatement notes, however, that
[t]he mere fact that both parties are
mistaken with respect to such an assumption does not, of itself, afford a
reason for avoidance of the contract by
the adversely affected party. Relief is
only appropriate in situations where a
mistake of both parties has such a
material effect on the agreed exchange
of performances as to upset the very
basis for the contract.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §152, comment
a, at 386 (1981).
3. A commentator describes the type of mistake a
court may correct through reformation:
If, on account of a mistake common to
both parties to a bilateral transaction the
written instrument does not express the
true agreement of the parties, equity will
generally correct the instrument so as to
conform to the actual bargain. Perhaps
the most common instance is that of a
conveyance which, because of a mistake
of the scrivener not discovered by either
party, describes too much or too little
property....
G. Clark, Equity §248, at 370-71 (1954).
4. See, e.g., Jensen v. Manila Corp. of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 565 P.2d 63,
64-65 (Utah 1977) (the written instrument failed to
conform with the intent of the parties and the court
reformed the deed to increase the size of the parcel
conveyed to include the boundaries on which the
parties had agreed).
5. We distinguish on their facts several cases
Gregory cites in support of his argument that rescission is the appropriate remedy. Robert Langston,
Ltd. v. McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554, 557 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987) (The parties agreed to the sale of a
ranching operation which included grazing permits,
cattle and personal property. However, the parties
were mistaken about the grazing permits, which had
been cancelled; about the number of cattle; and also
about the price and terms.); Eiland v. Powell, 136
W. Va. 25, 65 S.E.2d 737, 742 (1951) (the legal
description in the deed was identical to the legal
description in the contract, thus there was no
mistake by a drafter, just in the representations
made by the seller); Chesapeake Homes, Inc. v.
McGraff, 249 Md. 480, 240 A.2d 245, 249 (Ct.
App. 1968) (There was no mistake in the legal description of the property, the seller had misrepresented the boundaries. The court correctly concluded
the parties did not come to an agreement in the first
instance.); Our facts are much closer to the case of
Bartlett v. Department of Transp., 40 Md. App. 47,
388 A.2d 930 (1978). In Bartlett, the court dealt
with the issue of reformation of a deed when the
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parties believed the parcel to be 2-1/2 acres
smaller than it actually was. The Bartlett court reasoned that if a discrepancy in the size of the parcel
would not have prevented the party from entering
the contract, the mistake is immaterial and reformation is appropriate. Id. at 933.
6. Despite the trial court's findings, Gregory's
primary argument in favor of rescission is that he
would never have entered the agreement to sell
parcel one if he had known there would not be a
one-half acre parcel left in parcel two after the
subdivision.
Gregory's position fails for several reasons. First,
prior to the sale of parcel two to the Bradshaws, the
surveyor drafted a revised survey using the private
drive as a boundary which left parcel two with onehalf acre, but Gregory rejected that survey because
the Bradshaws' house would not fit on it. If, in
fact, Gregory's concern was only with parcel two
containing one-half acre, the revised survey would
have satisfied those concerns. Further, when
Gregory originally entered into the sale of parcel
one to the Grahns, the Grahns had an option to
purchase parcel two, thus the subsequent fact that
the Bradshaws' house plans would not fit on the
property as agreed to or the fact that a variance
would have to be obtained would not have been
relevant at the time of the original sale of parcel
one.
1. Even if Gregory had marshaled the evidence,
however, we find from our independent review of
the evidence that all elements for rescission based
upon unilateral mistake were not met.
Gregory's unilateral mistake did not relate to a
material feature of the contract because, as previously discussed, the size of parcel two was not a
material element in negotiating the sale of parcel
one.
Finally, Gregory's bald assertion that the Grahns
can receive damages to put them back to the status
quo is without support in the evidence. The evidence
at trial established that the Grahns sold their prior
home, invested at least $10,000 in improvements to
parcel one and put over 1600 hours of time making
the property livable and unique to their tastes.
8. Gregory also argues that under Utah law, a contract is merged into the deed and that when the deed
refers to a metes and bounds description which
differs from oral references to the private drive as
the boundary, the description in the deed prevails.
Mutual mistake is an exception to the general rule
that parol evidence may not contradict, vary, or add
to a deed. Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979, 981
(Utah 1979). The doctrine of merger is inapplicable
where, as here, one of the parties demonstrates a
mutual mistake in the drafting of the contractual
documents has occurred.
9. The Grahns argue the Bradshaws are not proper
appellants as they have not appealed the rescission
of their agreement with Gregory for the sale of
parcel two. We disagree. The argument in the Bradshaws' appeal, by inference, appeals the rescission
of the Gregory/Bradshaw agreement. By asserting
they are bona fide purchasers, thereby cutting off
the Grahns' reformation rights, the Bradshaws are
appealing the rescission of their contract which resulted from that reformation.
10. The Bradshaws argue they had an enforceable
contract with Rocky Mountain Refractories and as a
result of the wrongful injunction against building on
parcel two, they are entitled to damages for the loss
of that bargain.
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In Finding 21, the trial court found that
"|d}efendant Bradshaw did not have an enforceable
agreement with Rocky Mountain Refractories." The
Bradshaws merely baldly reassert that an enforceable agreement existed and do not sustain their
burden on appeal to marshal the evidence in support
of finding 21 and demonstrate the finding was
clearly erroneous. Even so, there is ample evidence
in the record to support the trial court's finding.
The representative of Rocky Mountain testified that
(1) there was no written contract, (2) other parties
would have to perform before that contract could
have been entered and those third parties had not
performed, and (3) no firm price or estimate of
materials had been reached. Thus, we conclude that
the trial court did not err in finding that there was
no enforceable agreement between Rocky Mountain
Refractories and the Bradshaws.
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FILED: October 25, 1990
Original Proceeding in this Court.
ATTORNEYS:
William W. Downes, Jr. and David Eckersley,
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Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Conder. 1
OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
Kathleen Nyrehn petitions this court for
review of the Industrial Commission's denial
of workers* compensation benefits. We
reverse.
Nyrehn worked as a stock room clerk for
Fred Meyer Stores. Her duties included pricing
and sorting merchandise contained in tubs
which were approximately 2 1/2 feet wide, 2
1/2 feet long, and 1 1/2 to 2 feet tall. The
tubs weighed between fifteen and forty pounds
each, depending on the contents, and were
stacked upon each other. Nyrehn would lift
and carry the tubs to and from a sorting area
approximately thirty to thirty-six times a
day. In addition to lifting the tubs, Nyrehn
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was involved in constant bending and stooping
to sort merchandise into different tubs. On
January 23, 1985, at approximately 11:00
a.m., Nyrehn felt a gradual onset of pain in
her lower back while performing her duties at
work. Despite the pain she continued to work.
The pain worsened until she finally had to
leave work early at approximately 4:00 p.m.
After three back operations, Nyrehn's pain
persisted and she was still unable to work. She
therefore sought permanent disability benefits.
After a hearing, an Administrative Law
Judge (A.L.J.) made the following relevant
findings of fact: (1) Nyrehn's pain of January
23, 1985 was not the result of a certain incident or activity, but rather the result of "two
and [a] half months of lifting tubs of merchandise 30 to 36 times a day;" (2) Nyrehn had
an asymptomatic preexisting condition, spondylolysis (disintegration or dissolution of a
vertebra); and (3) 75% of Nyrehn's total
permanent impairment existing at examination
was "caused by the industrial accident of
January 23, 1985," and 25% was due to
"preexisting incapacity of spondylolysis."
The A.L.J, also made the following relevant
conclusions of law: (1) Nyrehn injured her
lower back "by accident" in that her injury
was neither planned nor foreseen; (2) there
was a direct medical causal relationship
between the industrial accident and Nyrehn's
back problems; (3) due to her preexisting
condition, Nyrehn was required to prove legal
causation under Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986); and (4)
Nyrehn's job duties of lifting tubs of merchandise weighing between fifteen and forty
pounds did not amount to unusual or extraordinary exertion in excess of the normally
expected level of nonemployment activity for
men and women in the latter half of the twentieth century as required in Allen.1
Despite his conclusion that Nyrehn failed to
satisfy the Allen test, the A.L.J, awarded
Nyrehn permanent total disability benefits. He
refused to apply Allen because he felt that the
test was at odds with other Utah Supreme
Court cases indicating that handicapped
workers should not be placed in a hardship in
receiving compensation benefits. He also indicated that he believed the Allen test to be
unconstitutional because it set a different
standard for such handicapped workers.
Fred Meyer Stores and Liberty Mutual
Insurance (referred to collectively as Fred
Meyer) filed a motion with the Industrial
Commission to review the A.L.J.'s award. On
review, the Commission adopted the factual
findings of the A.L.J, and his conclusion that
Nyrehn failed to prove legal causation as
required under Allen. The Commission then
reversed the A.L.J.'s award of benefits, indicating that despite the A.L.J.'s concerns over
the constitutionality of the Allen test, the
Commission was required to apply the test.
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